Abstract-A physical unclonable function (PUF) generates hardware intrinsic volatile secrets by exploiting uncontrollable manufacturing randomness. Although PUFs provide the potential for lightweight and secure authentication for increasing numbers of low-end Internet of Things devices, practical and secure mechanisms remain elusive. Our work aims to explore simulatable PUFs (SimPUFs) that are physically unclonable but efficiently modeled mathematically through privileged one-time PUF access to address the problem of authentication for resource limited devices. Given a challenge, a securely stored SimPUF in possession of a trusted server computes the corresponding response and its bit-specific reliability. Consequently, naturally noisy PUF responses generated by a resource limited prover can be immediately processed by a one-way function (OWF) and transmitted to a server, because the resourceful server can exploit the SimPUF to perform a trial-and-error search over likely error patterns to recover the noisy response to authenticate the prover. Security of trial-and-error reverse (TREVERSE) authentication under the random oracle model is guaranteed by the hardness of inverting the OWF. We formally evaluate the authentication capability of TREVERSE authentication with two SimPUFs experimentally derived from popular silicon PUFs. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that our novel authentication mechanism can replace classical entity/client authentication without reliance on digitally stored non-volatile keys.
INTRODUCTION
Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) exploit manufacturing imperfections to extract hardware instance-specific secrets on demand. The unavoidable fabrication variations endows the PUF with physically unclonability. Thus, even the same manufacturer is incapable of forging two PUFs exhibiting identical behaviors. As a function, the PUF takes inputs (challenges) and react with instance-specific outputs (responses) referred to as challenge-response pairs (CRPs). The first silicon PUF, coined the Arbiter PUF (APUF) [1] was created in 2002. Since then, various PUF types such as ring oscillator PUF (ROPUF) [2] , [3] , SRAM PUF [4] , [5] and others [6] are proposed.
The PUF is to address secure key storage problem that does not rely on permanently presenting a key in digital form distinguishing from the traditional non-volatile memory (NVM) based key storage mechanism. While also minimizing the manufacture cost attributing to the fact that popular silicon PUFs are compatible with current CMOS fabrication processes, avoiding additional masks and pro- cessing steps required when fabricating NVM such as EEP-ROM and its successor Flash [2] , [7] , [8] .
Realizing the two primary PUF applications: i) secure cryptographic key derivation; and ii) lightweight authentication, however, is non-trivial in practice. The major hurdle is the naturally noisy nature of PUF responses. Most studied and popular silicon PUF responses are susceptible to thermal noise, environmental parameter (e.g., temperature, voltage) fluctuations. PUF based cryptographic primitive engineers address noisy responses using two approaches: PUF re-engineering: Generate intrinsically high reliable responses as in digital PUFs [9] - [11] or determining response reliability and only employing those highly reliable response as in a sense amplifier PUF (SAPUF) constructions [12] . The digital PUF and SAPUF, however, are not general approaches but are special PUF constructions. The former requires dedicated custom design considerations [10] , [11] and special fabrication steps such as hot carrier injection [9] . The bitmap of reliable responses (pointing reliable bit location) of the later, as a helper data, should be only readable but not writable to an attacker, which implies it has to be saved on-chip via ROM or hardwired [12] . Fuzzy Extractors: Use of fuzzy extractors is a generic approach to all PUF types and thus is dominant, which generates helper data to allow the subsequent correction of generated responses [2] , [7] , [13] . Unfortunately, fuzzy extractor implementations require significant hardware and computational resources. A reference FPGA implementation of a BCH code based extractor in [14] costs 149 FPGA slices; for comparison a SPONGENT-128 hashing implementation uses only 22 slices. In terms of induced time latency, error correction related computations consumes 5,0831 clock cycles while the hashing only consumes 3,990 clock cycles.
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SimPUF OWF e r conf Fig. 1 . TREVERSE considers three parties: the server, the resourceconstraint token and the adversary. The server holds a SimPUF that is a parameterized model of the physical PUF to not only accurately emulate the response e but also compute its corresponding reliability confidence conf . The confidence is never evaluated by the token and never exposed.
In other words, removing the ECC reduces up to 87% hardware overhead and 92% latency. Furthermore, required helper data from fuzzy extractor has been exploited in helper data manipulation attacks [7] , [13] , [15] as well as noise information based side channel attacks [16] , [17] . We observe that previous works have not fully leveraged unique properties of the PUF. By looking at the response characteristic closer, to be precise, leveraging the digitalized response bit itself and most importantly its bit-specific reliability in an oblivious manner. We present TREVERSE authentication: 1) For the first time, popular PUFs to date can directly work with an one-way function (OWF) primitive, thus, evading costly overhead for error correction mechanism, which in essence greatly hurts the lightweight performance of PUF applications. 2) In addition, associated helper data that is potentially exploitable by an adversary is not needed anymore. 3) Further, the TREVERSE mechanism is not limited to resolve authentication problem for a special PUF type, e.g., digital PUF and SAPUF [10] , [11] , but a wide range of PUF constructions, especially those prevalent ones including APUF, ROPUF and SRAM PUF, as long as an SimPUF has been enrolled by the server.
TREVERSE Overview
The TREVERSE, depicted in Fig. 1 , consists of three players: the resource-rich server, the resource-constraint token and the adversary. The server holds a SimPUF that is a parameterized model of the simulatable PUF embedded within the token 1 . Enrollment of the SimPUF is a one-time task conducted by the server in a secure environment before releasing the simulatable PUF integrated token. Acquisition of SimPUF by any other parties afterwards is disabled, e.g., by fusing the access wire to the PUF response. For the server, it utilizes the SimPUF to not only accurately compute the response bit e but also evaluate its reliability confidence conf given a random challenge c. Within the token, the OWF immediately processes the regenerated responseẽ.
1. To be clear, whenever the simulatable PUF is used, it always means the physical PUF. While the SimPUF always refers to the parameterized model of that physical PUF. When deployed in-the-flied, the token expands a received challenge seed (master challenge) c s into n subchallenges via a linear feedback shift register (LFSR): the c s is issued by the server. Then it generates the corresponding e. The tilde line is used here to distinguish the enrolled response e in the server side, because usually e =ẽ. Without error correcting,ẽ is processed and the output r=OWF(ẽ) is sent back to the server for authentication.
The server who securely manages the SimPUF emulates e and computes corresponding reliability confidence conf . To ease descriptions, we take an 8-bit e as an example (cf. Fig. 2 ). Following algorithm 1, the server performs TREVERSE authentication. Given the n-bit response e, it sorts all bits' reliability according to the conf , procedure sorting in algorithm 1. Consequently, an index vector ranks each response bit's reliability in a descending manner; lower the reliability, higher the ranking. For example, index 1 is corresponding to e 5 and index 2 is corresponding to e 1 . The m, where m < n, response bits, e index1 , ..., e indexm , are response bits with lowest reliability, which have very high chance to be erroneous under regeneration. The rest n−m response bits,ẽ indexm+1 , ...,ẽ indexn , will be reproduced reliably 2 . For the m-bit unreliable response bits, e index1 , ..., e indexm , the server tries all possible error combinations (patterns). While for the remaining n − m reliable response bits, the server sticks with the response values emulated via the SimPUF. Taking an example, in Fig. 2 , for an enrolled nbit, n = 8, response e and m = 3, we suppose that the regeneratedẽ is "01100011". During authentication, the server tries all possible combinations according to the order of e 5 , e 1 and e 2 -they are remarked as unknown symbol 'x' in the enrolled e-and compares the computed r =OWF(e) with receivedr. We assume that the server tries e 5 , e 1 and e 2 using "000", "001", ...., "110", "111" patterns in a sequential order and checks r accordingly. We easily see that within two trials the authenticity of the token is accepted because r =r. Notably, the worst case is checking, at most, 2 m trials. If all trials fail, the authenticity of the token is rejected.
Goals and Contributions
It was commonly believed that it is infeasible to hash (implementation of OWF in practice) PUF response directly. Because the unexpected response errors will disrupt the 2. It shall be clear later that the setting of m is flexible according to such as the expected operating condition range of the PUF token and other factors, which will be experimentally validated in Section 5 and Section 6.
Sorting reliability of e according to conf . Lower the reliability, higher the ranking.
2:
Quicksort or other sorting methodologies. 3: return index.
index is a vector, e.g., index1 and index2 are 5 and 1, respectively, for the example case in Fig. 2 . 4: end procedure 5: procedure authentication (e,r, index)
6:
for i = 1 : 2 m do m is a tunable parameter determining the top ranked m responses in index will to be tried and checked.
7:
Try one possible error for m response bits-e index 1 ,..., e indexm . For the rest n − m response bits using the enrolled values. One possible e is ready for trial.
8:
r =OWF(e)
9:
if r=r then r is from the token, wherer = OWF(ẽ).
10:
Accept authenticity.
11:
return 12: end if 13: end for 14: if none of the above 2 m trials successes then 15: Abort or initiate the next round TREVERSE authentication. hashed value and hence impedes successful authentications. Response errors, thereof, have to be reconciled via the error correction code (ECC) logic assisted by priorly computed helper data. Unfortunately, the ECC logic is very expensive (cf. Section 7.1.1). In addition, the helper data results into attack surface-e.g., leaking exploitable information to an adversary to perform modeling attacks through noise sidechannel information [17] and helper data manipulation attacks [15] , [18] . Thus, for popular silicon PUFs including LA-PUF, ROPUF and SRAM PUF, a simple, efficient lightweight secure authentications is regarded as a great challenge [17] , [19] - [21] . This work devises a PUF authentication mechanism, TREVERSE authentication, that is lightweight, secure and practical without suffering from the deficiencies aforementioned. To be precise, we present two specific TREVERSE instantiations. Eventually, implementation of one instantiation, forward referring to Fig. 7 , in the token side is on par with the NVM stored digital key based classical dynamic authentication, shown in Fig. 3 that is treated as the authentication baseline. The other TREVERSE instantiation, forward referring to Fig. 8 , even removes the nonce that is a must in the authentication baseline.
We make the following contributions in this work:
• We devise the TREVERSE authentication. It is a trialand-error approach trying and checking all potential response errors by the server, which fully leverages the securely enrolled SimPUF to successfully authenticate PUF tokens.
• We, counter-intuitively, directly process PUF responses through OWF without error correcting. As a consequence, helper data is no longer involved. We comprehensively evaluate the TREVERSE authentication security, in particular, being against all presently known modeling attacks under the random oracle model.
• We demonstrate that the TREVERSE authentication is a generic scheme as long as the SimPUF exists. While we observe that most PUFs having corresponding SimPUFs, for example, linear additive PUFs (APUF and k-sum ROPUF) [1] , [22] - [24] , SRAM PUFs [4] , ROPUFs [2] • We validate the top efficacy and practicability of the TREVERSE authentication through both formalized analyses and extensively experiments. We show that the authentication only takes (tens) thousands of trials and checks-can be further easily reduced according to our presented techniques, which is eventually negligible to the computational resource rich server. Thereof, the TREVERSE authentication is capable of handling a bunch of requests from a number of tokens concurrently that is suitable for realistic authentication scenarios.
Paper Organization
Background and related work are provided in Section 2.
In Section 3, we elaborate on two TREVERSE instantiations and then analyze their security. Section 4 statistically formalizes the TREVERSE authentication capability with respect to both false rejection rate and false acceptance rate. Based on public silicon PUF dataset, Section 5 experimentally evaluates authentication capability of both TREVERSE-A and TREVERSE-B. In Section 6, two compatible authentication capability augment methods are developed to assure the TREVERSE authentication to be more practical and efficient. In Section 7, we compare the TREVERSE authentication with previous works, followed by conclusions in Section 8.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

Response Bit-Specific Reliability
The PUF response regeneration exhibits (slightly) errors from query to query given the same challenge stimulated to the same PUF instance, which is usually referred to as PUF response unreliability. It has been noticed and experimentally validated that the response error is non-uniform, in other words, it is bit-specific [19] , [25] - [27] . This is the foundation of the TREVERSE. We next introduce how to gain such response bit-specific reliability by the server during the PUF provisioning phase with regard to three most popular silicon PUFs: SRAM PUFs, ROPUFs, and LAPUFs. to realize an efficient key generator by lowering the minentropy loss of the helper data [25] , [26] , where the bitspecific reliability is publicly known. To gain the bit-specific reliability during the enrollment phase, multiple physical measurements on the same SRAM PUF response is essential, suggested number of measurements 3 is in the order of 10 to 100 [25] , [26] . Note that the key generation efficacy comes at the cost of increased helper data size. In addition, integrity of the helper data that is usually publicly saved off-chip needs to be checked when it is loaded on-chip during key reconstruction phase to prevent malicious helper data manipulations [19] .
ROPUF
The ROPUF produces a response upon comparing frequencies of a pair of ring oscillators (ROs) designed identically but varying in practice due to fabrication randomness. The response bit-specific reliability is evaluated straightforward by subtracting the frequencies of two ROs without reliance on time-consuming multiple measurements. Such an easyto-acquire soft-decision helper data of the ROPUF has been utilized to yield a higher coding gain for key generation [27] .
Linear Additive PUF
One of the most popular PUF topology is the linear additive PUF (LAPUF) [22] - [24] . Representatives of the LAPUF are: APUF and k-sum ROPUF. The LAPUF is built upon linear additive blocks to yield a very large number of CRPs given limited area overhead.
APUF. The APUF, as illustrated in Fig. 4 , has k stages of two 2-input multiplexers, or any other units forming two theoretically identical signal paths. To generate a response bit, a pulse is applied to the first stage input, while the challenge c determines the signal path to the next stage. The input pulse will race through each multiplexer path (top and bottom paths) in parallel against each other. At the end of the APUF circuit, an arbiter, e.g., a latch or D-flipflop, determines whether the top or bottom signal arrives first and reacts with a logic '0' or '1' accordingly. States the other way, if the time delay difference t dif > 0, where
k-sum ROPUF. The main difference between the APUF and k-sum ROPUF is that each stage of the APUF is replaced with a pair of ROs [22] - [24] . Instead of the delay time at each stage is summed in the APUF, the frequency of RO at each stage is summed. At the end of the k-sum ROPUF, there is a comparator replacing the functionality of the arbiter of the APUF. As generalized in Fig. 5 , each k-sum ROPUF has 2 · k ROs. The challenge determines which RO at each stage contributes to the top row, while the other one for bottom row. Frequencies of the top and bottom rows are summed and compared to generate a response [22] - [24] . 3 . Increasing the number of repeats to obtain a more accurate response bit-specific reliability will further facilitate the TREVERSE authentication, with trade-off of enrollment time. From the modeling perspective, the APUF and the k-sum ROPUF are reduced to the same topology [24] . On one hand, it has been widely shown that the LAPUF is vulnerable to modeling attacks [17] , [28] - [31] . On the other hand, easy-to-learn of a basic LAPUF benefits PUF enrollment, where response given any challenge is emulated on demand through the LAPUF model to circumvent the difficulties of managing a large CRP database [20] , [24] .
Modeling Attacks
The modeling attack realized by machine learning techniques is regarded as the most vexing form of attacks on the popular strong PUF candidate, in particular, the LAPUF [1] , [32] . In general, the modeling attack aims to obtain a learned LAPUF model through training by using a small number of collected CRPs. The obtained LAPUF model can predict responses given not yet seen challenges with high accuracy, thus, breaks the security-unpredictability-of the LAPUF. Various countermeasures have been presented to increase the complexity of modeling attacks including XOR-APUF, Feedforward APUF, Lightweight Secure PUF [32] , [33] and Obfuscated PUFs [24] , [34] . However, modeling attacks from different research groups imply that all above countermeasures are insufficient [17] , [28] , [30] , [31] , [35] .
Protect PUF Interface
It is clear that direct access to PUFs such as ROPUF and SRAM PUF with limited CRP space, usually classified into weak PUF category, should be prevented. Because responses of weak PUF can be exhaustively readout within a short time. While for the strong PUF such as LAPUF with a very large CRP space that cannot be characterized within e.g., years. It is now recognized, at least highly recommended, that an open LAPUF interface is hard to counteract various modeling attacks [17] , [19] , [20] , [31] . Thus, LAPUF interface also needs to be protected to substantially improve the LAPUF resilience to modeling attacks [19] , [20] . Here, we briefly describe two most related work: controlled PUF (CPUF) [36] , [37] and lockdown PUF [20] .
Controlled PUF
The CPUF is a PUF that is equipped with a control logic limiting the ways in which the PUF can be evaluated to prevent adaptively challenge chosen attacks. As illustrated in Fig. 6 , the challenge is pre-processed while the response is then post-processed, all via OWF. Before the OWF, the unreliable responses are required to be corrected. However, the ECC logic and storing of helper data are always expensive. In addition, the computed helper data needs to be stored and carefully protected, otherwise, it poses the CPUF under a potential threat-reliability-based modeling attacks [17] , [38] . If the helper data is stored off-chip that is usually the case for CPUF, then helper data manipulation also needs to be carefully addressed through, e.g., helper data integrity check before loading it on-chip [15] , [19] . However, this induces more area and power overhead.
Lockdown PUF
The lockdown PUF restricts the maximum number of LA-PUF CRPs that can be acquired by an adversary [20] . This is achieved by an explicit CRP release. Generally, the token and the server together determine challenges presented to the LAPUF. Responses are divided into two subparts, the first subpart needs to be firstly provided by the server. The later subpart is visible only when the first subpart response sent from the server is close enough to that generated by the token. Thus, an adversary is unable to obtain new CRP materials without authorization from the server. Once a number of authentication rounds is reached, e.g., typically 1000 times [20] , the token is disposed and never used again. Such a technique, in essence, not intends to invent an architecture to increase the complexity of modeling attacks by the adversary. In the other way round, it limits the ability of obtaining adequate CRPs for training by the adversary to prevent modeling attacks.
Reverse Fuzzy Extractor
It is noticed that on-chip ECC decoder normally implemented in token side is heavy, while the helper data generation-ECC encoder-is much less resourceconsuming. Therefore, in [39] , the decoder is constructively placed on the resource-rich server side, while places the encoder that computes the helper data on the token side. We use the 'reverse' term to only refer to the exploitation of a resource-rich server to perform authentications. Neither ECC decoder nor encoder exists in the TREVERSE.
Trapdoor Computational Fuzzy Extractor
Herder et al. [40] propose the computationally-secure fuzzy extractor to extract cryptographic keys from the PUF, while the response reliability confidence information is treated as a trapdoor to build up a stateless key generator. In other words, the response reliability information is never exposed but measured internally within the PUF key generator on demand-discarded after internal usage. In this context, the ROPUF is chosen for experimentally validations. Because the ROPUF's response reliability confidence that can be directly acquired via subtracting frequencies of two ROs meets with the trapdoor requirement. However, most PUF's response reliability confidence is hard to be directly and easily measured on-chip. For instance, the APUF's response reliability is not measurable on-chip unless using expensive peripheral circuits. Therefore, the stateless key generator exploiting the trapdoor reliability information is not, or at least difficult, applicable to other PUF structures.
Firstly, the TREVERSE does not require the token to measure the response reliability, which is suitable for a wide range of PUF types including LAPUFs, ROPUFs, and SRAM PUFs-as long as the PUF has its corresponding SimPUF. Secondly, in [40] , the token has to take all the computation burden to reconstruct a stateless key that is targeted for key generation. Lightweight appears not the concern. Conversely, TREVERSE aims at lightweight and secure authentication by moving as much as computation from the token to the server.
TREVERSE AUTHENTICATION: TWO INSTANTI-ATIONS AND SECURITY ANALYSES
We develop two specific TREVERSE authentication instantiations followed by analyzing their security. The first instantiation, TREVERSE-A, is applicable to all PUFs: weak PUF and strong PUF. The second instantiation, TREVERSE-B, is tailored to fit the strong PUF, in particular, the LAPUF.
We first give notations and preliminaries.
Notations and Preliminaries
Binary vectors are denoted with a bold lowercase character, e.g., challenge c and response e. Regenerated response from the PUF during authentication is denoted with a tilde line, e.g.,ẽ. All vectors are row vectors. A set is denoted with calligraphic character, e.g., challenge set C and response set E. Custom-defined procedure or function is printed in a sans-serif font, e.g., Hamming distance HD(x, y). We follow the definition on PUF in [7] . Definition 1. PUF: For a given manufacturing process, a PUF is a manufactured building block that realizes a nondeterministic mapping from a set C ∈ {0, 1} λ to a set E ∈ {0, 1} η , where the distribution of each random variable e i , with i ∈ [1, |C|], depends on process variations, noise, environmental variables, and aging. Therefore, two random evaluations of the response given the same challenge might slightly vary but with an upper bound HD(e,ẽ)≤ th, with threshold th a constant.
The PUF cannot be physically cloned. Ideally, the PUF should also show software unclonability. However, it appears that software unclonability is hard to meet without protecting the PUF interface properly, especially, to those silicon PUFs. For example, LAPUF are vulnerable to modeling attacks where a software copy can be learned. As for ROPUF and SRAM PUF, their limited CRP can be exhaustively readout to create a software copy 4 . We refer those PUFs that can be emulated through a software copy to as simulatable PUFs. Note that an extra on-chip TRNG is only required on the condition that the PUF response is dependent on each other, for example, in the LAPUF case. If the PUF is such as ROPUF and SRAM PUF that responses are generated independently, the TRNG can be removed, where the server sends a nonce during authentication.
Definition 2. Simulatable PUF: 5 If a PUF has a parameterized model SimPUF that is capable of computing a responsẽ e and its corresponding reliability confidence conf through (ẽ, conf ) ←SimPUF(c). Theẽ is indistinguishable from the response e-P(ẽ = e) is -close to 1. The conf is also -close to conf , where (e, conf ) ←PUF(c). We call such a PUF is the simulatable PUF and its corresponding parameterized model is SimPUF.
Here, we would like to draw one's attention that the fundamental difference between the Simulatable PUF definition and the PUF definition is whether the bit-specific reliability information is concerned or not. In addition, the simulatable PUF is efficiently software clonable to gain SimPUF.
Definition 3. One-Way Function
A function f is one-way if and only if OWF can be computed by a polynomial time algorithm, but any polynomial time randomized OWF − that attempts to computing a pseduo-inverse for OWF succeeds with negligible probability.
Gain SimPUF
Corresponding to Section 2.1, we specific the way of gaining SimPUF for LAPUF, ROPUF and SRAM PUF during the provisioning phase.
1) The LAPUF can be accurately modeled [28] via machine learning given a small collection of CRPs. The learned LAPUF model can accurately predict the response given a random challenge and assess the response's bitspecific reliability. Thus, the learned LAPUF model is actually the SimPUF.
2) The server measures and saves all ROs' frequency, which is treated as the SimPUF of ROPUF. The pairwised comparison of two chosen ROs' frequency gives the response, while the frequency subtraction of these two chosen ROs is the bit-specific reliability. 3) As for the SRAM PUF, its response can be exhaustively readout, whereas the bit-specific reliability can be obtained via repeated evaluations given the same response. Therefore, its SimPUF is acquired.
TREVERSE-A
Overview of TREVERSE-A is shown in Fig. 7 . The PUF can be weak PUF and strong PUF. Thus, it is a generic 5 . We are aware that the Simulatable PUF term was previously used by Ruhrmair et. al in 2013 [41] . However, the definition is quite different from us. In general, the Simulatable PUF in [41] only requires to emulate the response accurately, it has no requirements on the bitspecific reliability evaluation. instantiation. The PUF teams with the OWF, while the extra on-chip TRNG is only required when the PUF response is not independent to each other, for example, in the LA-PUF case. If the PUF is such as ROPUF and SRAM PUF that responses are produced independently, the TRNG is not needed, where the server sends a nonce to the token during authentication. Ther as a function of bothẽ and the nonce-r=OWF(r, nonce)-is sent to the server publicly. The TREVERSE-A, from the token side, is on par with the authentication baseline, see Fig. 3 , where the digital key is encrypted to avoid exposure and the public nonce is exploited to avoid replaying attacks.
TREVERSE-B
Unlike the TREVERSE-A, the TREVERSE-B depicted in Fig. 8 is tailored for the LAPUF. The TREVERSE-B instantiation only teams with the OWF-noting that one OWF logic implementation can be dual used by the pre-and post-OWF. Ther is solely a function of the regeneratedẽ, wherẽ r=OWF(ẽ) 6 . The TREVERSE-A even removes the nonce that is a must in the authentication baseline (cf. Fig. 3 ).
Security Analysis
Adversary Model
The adversary model [20] , [28] , [30] , [34] is always considered to evaluate the PUF security, which we adopt to evaluate security of TREVERSE. It is assumed that SimPUF enrolment is performed by the server in a secure environment and prohibited afterwards. An adversary is allowed to eavesdrop on the communication channel and arbitrarily apply challenges via the publicly accessible TREVERSE-A and TREVERSE-B interface to observer. In addition, the adversary can observe and manipulate the nonce in the TREVERSE-B. Same to previous work [20] , [28] , [30] , [34] , this work focuses on common attacks including brute-force attacks, replaying attacks, and especially modeling attacks.
Although we do not specifically targeting to resolve the following attacks, we show their existential countermeasures with which TREVERSE is fully compatible. In comparison with digitally stored key, the PUF has higher tamper resistance to the invasive attack. If the attacker intends to delayer the IC and probing internal PUF secrecy, to a large extent, he will alter the PUF CRP behavior or even destroy it once the PUF layout is carefully handled, one example is the controlled strong PUF (cf. Section 2.3.1). The other example is the capacitive PUF [42] . For the hybrid attacks combining timing and power side channel information with 6 . To be precise,r=OWF(ẽ, OWF(cs). As the term of OWF(cs) does not affect the authentication capability and security analysis, we remove it here from main text for simplicity. machine learning, this usually requires on-chip peripheral circuits [43] to measure side channel information. However, those circuits appear not available in the resource-constraint devices. In addition, these attacks can be eliminated through careful circuit design techniques, e.g., dynamic and differential CMOS logic [43] . The other photonic side channel information attack [44] requires laboratory equipments and professional skills, it can also be eliminated via circuit design techniques, e.g., interconnect meshes [45] .
Brute-force Attacks
An adversary can perform brute-force attacks. The adversary has two options: i) guessingẽ; ii) guessingr. The adversary may tend to choose the former. Because the adversary does not need to consider the m-bit unreliable bits when guessing the former. The probability of correctly guessing a responseẽ is expressed as:
where the τ is the response bias to be '1'/'0'. Brute-force attacks are extremely unlike to succeed. For example, when n = 64 and setting m = 12, assuming that the response has a severely bias of 0.65-'1' probability, the P is 1.87 × 10 −10 < 10 −9 . Notably, modern PUFs usually have low bias where the τ is normally close to 0.5 [21] .
Replaying Attacks
In the TREVERSE-A, the nonce is dynamically refreshed for each authentication round when the same c s is applied. In the TREVERSE-B case, each challenge seed c s is only employed once for each authentication round as the LAPUF has a very large CRP pool. Thus, replaying attacks are halted for both TREVERSE-A and TREVERSE-B.
Modeling Attacks: TREVERSE-A
Reminding that TREVERSE-A is a generic design to both weak PUF and strong PUFs. When the weak PUFs such as ROPUFs and SRAM PUFs are exploited, these PUFs are inherently immune to modeling attacks. Because their CRPs are independent.
When the LAPUF is deployed in the TREVERSE-A, conventional modeling attacks in [28] , [30] requiring a collection of CRPs is prevented because of the OWF impeding direct observation of the response e. As for the reliabilitybased modeling attack, generally, an attacker has to know each response's reliability information. Notably, determination of a response's reliability requires repeatedly measurements. The on-chip TRNG prevents multiple observations on the responses given the same challenge. Therefore, the reliability-based modeling attack is halted-this shall be more clear after going through Section 3.5.5. Overall, all presently known modeling attacks are prevented.
Modeling Attacks: TREVERSE-B
The TREVERSE-B, to a large degree, can be viewed as a cut-down CPUF without ECC logic, see Fig. 6 and Fig. 8 for a comparison. The CPUF provides reinforcement against conventional modeling attacks exploiting such as support vector machine (SVM) and logistic regression (LR) machine learning algorithms [28] , [30] attributing to the OWF [19] .
The TREVERSE-B inherits all the modeling attack resilience from the CPUF. Thus, TREVERSE-B is also resilient to conventional modeling attacks. We focus on, and thus analyze, the TREVERSE-B resilience to the recent revealed reliability based modeling attacks that exploit the noise side-channel information, where a direct relationship between a challenge and a response is not a must [17] . The adversary's target is to gain response reliability information.
It was analyzed in a recent study [19] that the CPUF is overprotected against PUF modeling attacks, where the succeeding OWF already provides a full protection and the preceding OWF is unnecessary. We stress that the preceding OWF is a must not only for the CPUF but also for the TREVERSE-B, in particular, to against reliability based modeling attacks [17] .
We firstly remind the reader to recall that the LFSR is used to sequentially concatenate a n-bit response. Supposing that the preceding OWF is removed, the challenge seed c s can be directly applied to the LFSR. Then, the adversary has a chance to gain reliability information given certain challenges. In addition, one should note that the adversary is able to precisely control the PUF's working condition, for instances, supply voltage and temperature when a challenge seed c s is repeatedly queried to perform multiple measurements. Given a n-bit response, the probability of discovering a c s that ensures all n bits exhibiting no error is:
with the average response error rate.
Under a precisely controlled operating condition, the is very small, which leads to a non-negligible P rel . For example, experimental results in [21] report that the for APUF is 3.56% under a well controlled operating condition, which leads to P rel being 0.0097 with n = 128. Once a c s1 gives sub-challenges c (11) , ..., c (1n) that are all reliable challenges. Repeatedly applying c s1 presents the samer 1 . Then, the adversary is able to find the other challenge seed c s2 giving sub-challenges c (21) , c (11) ..., c (1(n−1)) . Repeatedly applying c s2 to the TREVERSE-B gives the adversary reliability information of c (21) . To be precise, ifr 2 is constant under multiple measurements, c (21) is a reliable challenge. Otherwise, c (21) is an unreliable challenge. Once reliability of a collection of challenges is exposed, reliability based modeling attacks become feasible. The preceding OWF prevents the adversary judiciously determining c s2 that leads to c (21) , c (11) ..., c (1(n−1)) . In other words, adaptively challenge-chosen attacks are prohibited [1] . Eventually, the reliability information is oblivious to an attacker. As a consequence, reliability based modeling attacks are prevented attributing to the infeasibility of gaining reliability information given a challenge.
To this end, the TREVERSE-B is shown to be resilient to all presently known modeling attacks.
FORMALIZING AUTHENTICATION CAPABILITY
This section formalizes the false acceptance rate (FAR) and false rejection rate (FRR) of the TREVERSE authentication. 
False Acceptance Rate
The TREVERSE authentication has zero tolerance on errors occurred within the server deemed n − m reliable response bits,ẽ indexm+1 , ...,ẽ indexn attributing to the OWF. Reminding that the server takes a strict acceptance criterion of e indexm+1 = e indexm+1 , ...,ẽ indexn = e indexn . Thus, given m and n, the FAR is expressed as:
the τ is the response bias. Actually, the FAR is same to the brute-force attack success probability in Eq (1), which is extremely small in practice.
False Rejection Rate
Formalization of FRR requires an accurate PUF reliability model that capture precise bit-specific reliability, we use such a model following [25] , [40] , [46] . We consider CONF i as random variables that are the response reliability confidence of the i th response bit e i measured in the enrollment phase. Similarly, CONF i are random variables that are the remeasured response bit confidence of the i th response bitẽ i during the regeneration phase. It has been shown that CONF i and CONF i follow the same normal distribution of N ∼ (µ INTER , σ INTER )-in Fig. 9 , (µ INTER ) = 0 is illustrated for simplicity [40] . As CONF i and CONF i are measured from the same response bit during the enrollment phase and regeneration phase respectively. Therefore, the conditional distribution of Pr(CONF i | CONF i = conf) is much narrower, which follows normal distribution of N ∼ (conf, σ INTRA ) as shown in Fig 9. The mean value is conf that is a measured confidence value and the variance is σ INTRA .
It is recognized that CONF i and CONF i are corresponding to the same response bit, thereby, their distribution are same. More specifically, ∀conf, Pr(CONF i | CONF i = conf) = Pr( CONF i |CONF i = conf). This is important, because now we are able to use the confidence information enrolled in the enrollment phase to reason about the error probability of a reevaluated given response bit.
Following [25] , we say thatẽ i = 1 if CONF i < 0 and e i = 0 if CONF i > 0 (usingẽ i = 0 if CONF i > 0 and e i = 1 if CONF i < 0 will give same results at the end), we define the one-probability that is the probability of being one under a reevaluation j for response e i as:
By considering Pr(CONF i | CONF i = conf) that follows N ∼ (conf, σ INTRA ), the Eq(4) is expressed as:
with Φ the standard normal cumulative distribution function (CDF). The pẽ i of a given response is a sample from variable Pẽ by considering all bits. The CDF of Pẽ can be derived as:
with λ 1 = σINTRA σINTER and λ 2 = µINTER σINTER . Next, we are able to find response error distribution based on the one-probability. Firstly, following [25] , we define the correct enrolled response e 
If the p ei < 1/2, then it gives e C i = 0. Otherwise, if the p ei > 1/2, then it gives e C i = 1. Now, the error probability given a bitẽ i can be defined:
Plugging Eq (7) into Eq(8), the pẽ rri is given:
The p erri given responseẽ i is sampled from variable P erri when considering all the response bits. Now the CDF of P erri can be given:
To ease the following understanding, we use an example to describe what CDFp err (x) stands for in a general way. The Fig. 10 7 shows the CDFp err (x) as a function of x. In general, there are CDFp err (x) percentage of response bits satisfying that their error probabilities are below x. For example, more than 10% responses' error probability is less than 10 −7 .
7. Here, λ 1 = 0.3231 and λ 2 = −0.3477, we will see that these values are drawn from real measurements from the ROPUF in Table. 1. Now we can think the above description in the other way around. We say a response bit e i is a reliable response bit when its error probability p erri ≤ x. Then the probability ofẽ i being stable is actually CDFp err (x) [40] . By keeping this in mind in the following, we now start deriving the FRR.
The number of errors in an n-bit response is no longer following binomial distribution but Poisson-binomial distribution [46] . Given n response bits, their error probabilities p err = (p err1 , ..., p errn ) can be randomly sampled given the CDFp err (x) by using inverse transform sampling 8 [46] . We then sort p err in a descending manner and obtain p S err . Next, we exclude the first m elements in p S err -this equals to that TREVERSE authentication tolerates m bits with lowest reliability confidence-to get p S(n−m) err with length of n − m. The rest n − m bits have an error probability vector of p S(n−m) err . The FRR is given as:
with F PB (t;p
) the Poisson-binomial CDF [46] . The t=0 means that the remaining n − m bits exhibit no error. Noting that the FRR is not analytically given. In practice, randomly sampling a large number of n-bit responses, repeatedly evaluating the corresponding Eq (11), and use the mean of FRR of those evaluations is adopted.
To this end, given σ INTER , σ INTRA , µ INTER -these three determine λ 1 and λ 2 -and application determined m and n, one can accurately estimate the FRR according to the PUF's operating range. As we shall see in Section 5, λ 1 and λ 2 can be determined conveniently during the enrollment phase.
EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
We validate the efficacy and practicality of the devised two TREVERSE instantiations: TREVERSE-A and TREVERSE-B. To validate TREVERSE-A, we use ROPUF that is a weak PUF. To validate TREVERSE-B, we use one representative of LAPUF: k-sum ROPUF.
TREVERSE-A
ROPUF Dataset Description
We use Virginia Tech's public ROPUF dataset for validation, in this dataset, five ROPUFs are implemented across five Spartan3E S500 FPGA boards. Each FPGA implements one ROPUF that consists of 512 ROs. Details are referred to [47] . The dataset contains each RO's frequency measurements. Each RO's frequency is measured 100 times under 0.96 V, 1.08 V, 1.20 V, 1.32 V, 1.44 V, respectively, at a fixed temperature of 25
• C to reflect supply voltage influence. Similarly, each RO's frequency is also evaluated 100 times under 35
• C, 45
• C, 55
• C, 65
• C, respectively, with a fixed supply voltage of 1.20 V, to reflect influence from temperature changes. 8 . The inverse transform sampling requires an inverse function of the CDFperr(x), which cannot be easily derived. It is recognized that an alternative is using data interpolation method. The default function in MATLAB 2012b is interpl command. = 130816 possible combinations to select a pair of ROs out of 512 ROs in one ROPUF 9 . Therefore, one ROPUF yields 130816 CRPs. The reliability of all five ROPUFs are evaluated. Worst unreliability will result in worst FRR, thus, we are interested in the ROPUF instance that exhibits the worst BER or , which is summarized in Table. 1 (second column) under varying operating conditions. The BER is predominately influenced by the supply voltage, which is in well agreement with other reports [47] .
The reliability confidence of the ROPUF is the frequency subtraction of the pairwise ROs. For all 130816 response bits, distribution of frequency subtraction of these response bits are evaluated under different operating conditions. Same to the observation in [40] . the mean and variance of the distribution changes only slightly under differing operating conditions. Thus, the µ INTER and σ INTER measured under the nominal operating condition is used, as shown in Fig. 11 . Notably, the µ INTER is not ideally equal to 0 that thereby induces a severely bias, in particular, response '1' to be 36.65%. To measure σ INTRA and µ INTRA , the frequency subtraction given all response bits are measured under the nominal operating condition treated as a reference, then frequency subtraction given all response bits are measured again under a deviating operating condition. The change between these two measurements, CONF i − CONF i , is assessed. The distribution is recognized as Pr(CONF i − CONF i ) [40] . The standard deviation is the σ INTRA . In Fig. 11 the σ INTRA evaluated under the worst-corner of (0.96 V, 25
• C) is shown. 9 . Note that we can use each RO only once to extract a 256-bit response to make the response generation independent. The reason of not doing so here is to facilitate the experimental demonstration with a large CRP sample. The FRR from empirical evaluations and FRR statistical analyses based on Eq(11) are listed for comparison, where the format is (empirical; statistical).
Results
Empirical and statistical results of FRR are shown in Table 2 . They agree well. The FRR decreases as the m increases. In addition, the FRR is minimizing when theẽ is regenerated under an operating condition that is close to the nominal operating condition. For example, the FRR is 1.04% when theẽ is evaluated under the (65 • C, 1.20 V) operating corner during authentication with m = 12. In contrast, the FRR goes up to 24.75% even with m = 26 when theẽ is reproduced under a greatly deviated operating corner of (25
• C, 0.96 V) that has a −20% voltage variation 10 . One may note that the statistical results shows a conservative assessment of the FRR in comparison with the empirical results. The reason is that the response has a severely bias, response '1' to be 36.65%, in this ROPUF case. In other words, Pr(CONF i ) in Fig. 2 not follows a normal distribution with mean value of zero-µ INTER deviates from zero, which explains the conservative assessments [40] .
TREVERSE-B
We use the k-sum ROPUF as a representative of the LAPUF to validate the TREVERSE-B.
LAPUF dataset description
Frequency measurements of all ROs, described in Section 5.1.1, are leveraged to form k-sum ROPUF. We evaluated five k-sum ROPUFs; each of them is constructed in one FPGA board by using 128 ROs-k = 64. The frequency summation and consequent comparison are post-processed using MATLAB. Among five evaluated k-sum ROPUFs, the most noisy k-sum ROPUFs with worst-case BER of 14.53% occurred at (0.96 V, 25
• C) is most interested, while the (1.20 V, 25
• C) acts as the nominal operating corner. Later on, we call the k-sum ROPUF as LAPUF for convenience.
Extraction of λ 1 and λ 2 from LAPUF model
The reliability confidence information of the LAPUF is predicted by the LAPUF model that serves as SimPUF. We use 10,000 challenges to extract λ 1 and λ 2 .
The reliability confidence of the response bit of the LAPUF is the frequency subtraction (difference) between the top and bottom RO rows. By predicting frequency differences given all response bits through the LAPUF model 10 . As a remark here, the reader would expect that (65 • C, 0.96 V) would be the worst corner. But the FRR under this corner is not shown. This is because the (65 • C, 0.96 V) corner data is unavailable from the public data set. The FRR format is same with that of Table 2 .
under the nominal operating condition and plotting all frequency differences, the standard variance is recognized as σ INTER and the mean is the µ INTER .
To extract σ INTRA , the frequency differences given all response bits are predicted by the LAPUF model trained by CRPs evaluated under the nominal condition as a reference, then frequency differences for all the same response bits are predicted again by the LAPUF model trained with CRPs evaluated under a differing operating condition. The change between these two evaluations, CONF i − CONF i , is calculated. By plotting 10,000 frequency changes, the Pr(CONF i − CONF i ) distribution is obtained. Then its standard deviation is recognized as the σ INTRA and the mean is µ INTRA . Once the σ INTER , µ INTER and σ INTRA are acquired, the λ 1 and λ 2 can be directly determined. In Table 3 , λ 1 and evaluated under different operating conditions and the λ 2 are summarized.
Results
Empirically and statistically evaluated FRR of the LAPUF are shown in Table 4 respectively. Instead of that the empirical FRR is always smaller than the statistical FRR as for the ROPUF in Table 2 , they almost perfectly agree with each other in the LAPUF results here. Recall that the conservative statistical FRR for ROPUF is induced by the severely response bias of the ROPUF that is 36.65%, while the response bias of the investigated LAPUF is 50.05%. Therefore, the statistical FRR is accurately reflects the empirical FRR even though the statistical FRR evaluation of the LAPUF is built upon learned LAPUF models. the server at the PUF provisioning phase. To be precise, it is just enrolling two SimPUFs given the same PUF but under two operating conditions-one under nominal operating condition, the other under (expected) worse-case operating corner.
Remarks
Recommend TREVERSE-B
We recommend the TREVERSE-B tailored for LAPUF given the following facts:
1) There is no need of the nonce.
2) The SimPUF of the LAPUF is obtained through machine learning instead of exhaustive physical measurements (cf. Section 2.1).
3) The LAPUF structure is compact and lightweight with regarding to area and power consumption, in particular, when deploying the APUF.
AUGMENT AUTHENTICATION CAPABILITY
It is paramount to set a small m from the practicability perspective. Because m stands for the computation overhead to the server. The smaller m, less computation for the server to authenticate a single token, which in turn assures authenticating more tokens concurrently by the server. In this section, we present two simple, efficient and compatible methods to substantially reduce the FRR but only having negligible increasement on the FAR when setting a small m.
d-Authentication
The first method is d-authentication. In one authentication session, the server issues d challenge seeds c s1 , ..., c sd . The token sequentially returns d outputsr 1 , ...,r d . The server performs authentication to each received output sequentially. Authentication succeeds once a received output is accepted and then the server stops checking the rest. Consequently, this authentication session successfully completes. If none of d received outputs can pass the authentication, then this authentication session is rejected. The FRR of d-authentication, FRR d , is given as:
Detailed results of FRR d of ROPUF and LAPUF can be found in Appendix.
As for the FAR d , it is expressed as:
We can see that d-authentication only linearly increases FAR while exponentially minimizes FRR. Therefore, the FAR d is still extremely small. For example, taking the ROPUF case that has severe response bias of 36.65% as an example, the FAR d is still less than 10 −9 when setting n = 64, m = 12 and d = 10.
Multiple-Reference
The second method explores multiple referenced responses to enhance the authentication capability. Overall, at the provisioning phase, multiple responses e ref and their corresponding conf ref under discrete operating corners subject to the same challenges applied to the same PUF are enrolled.
In other words, instead of enrolling one SimPUF under only one operating condition-nominal condition, multiple SimPUFs are enrolled under discrete operating corners.
Taking ROPUF as an example to ease understanding, during the enrollment phase, the frequencies of all ROs are measured under two operating corners: (25 • C, 1.08 V) and (25 • C, 1.32 V). As a consequence, the e ref1 , e ref2 and their corresponding conf ref1 , conf ref2 are obtained, where ref 1 and ref 2 are operating corners of (25
• C,1.08 V) and (25
• C,1.32 V), respectively. During the authentication, for each receivedr, TREVERSE authentication is performed oñ r based on both e ref1 , e ref2 at the same time. If any one of two TREVERSE authentications passes-r = r ref1 or r = r ref2 , the authentication succeeds. This helps decreasing the FRR significantly. The FRR when multiple-reference is utilized, hence termed as FRR mr , is formalized as:
with FRR refi is the FRR when a single referenced operating corner is used for TREVERSE authentication. M is the number of referenced operating corners enrolled. Detailed results of FRR mr of ROPUF and LAPUF can be found in Appendix.
As for the FAR mr , again, it is only linearly increased and is expressed as:
Merging d-Authentication and Multiple-Reference
The above two authentication augment methods are compatible with each other. When both methods are implemented together, the FRR and FAR are termed as FRR Md and FAR Md and expressed as:
The M stands for the number of referenced responses and the d is the number of authentication rounds used during one authentication session. The FRR refi is referred back to Eq(11) and the FAR to Eq(3).
Both ROPUF (TREVERSE-A) and LAPUF (TREVERSE-B) are extensively tested, see results in Table 5 and Table 6 , where two references are employed (M = 2) and d = 10. In this context, tens of thousands of error-and-trials computation burden is negligible by the resource-rich server, thereby, enabling a large number of PUF embedded tokens to be authenticated at the same time.
Notably, in our experimental validations, we only use tworeference while there is no difficult for using more references by the server to further significantly reduce the FRR, which will make the error-and-trials computation burden even lower. One also please note that using more references brings no overhead to the token. The FRR Md formation is same to that of Table 5 .
DISCUSSION AND COMPARISON
According to the recent survey on nineteen PUF-based lightweight authentication protocols [19] , only six protocols are left that are robust against noisy PUF response and modeling attacks. All these six protocols fall into the form of PUF-based key generations. The regenerated response errors need to be corrected to derive a key. Then the key is used for authentication. Except reverse fuzzy extractor based authentication [39] , all other protocols require an onchip ECC decoder. However, the reverse fuzzy extractor still requires an on-chip ECC encoder, though it consumes less overhead than the decoder. For all six protocols, public known helper data is a must to assist the error correction. Our presented TREVERSE authentication removes ECC logic as well as helper data 11 .
Lightweight and Security
Lightweight
We evaluate the lightweight from both hardware and software implementation overhead. Hardware Overhead: As highlighted in Section Introduction, a referenced fully implemented PUF-based key generator on FPGA platform [14] resorts to concatenate of a (7, 1, 3) repetition code and a BCH(318, 174, 17) code for error correction costing 112 and 37 FPGA slices, respectively. In contrast, a hash implementation-SPONGENT-128 only consumes 22 slices.
Software Overhead: We also tested error correction and hash overhead based on software implementation on the microcontroller embedded within a computational RFID (CRFID) transponder. The overhead is assessed by required 11 . Strictly, we do not need any helper data unless one insists to call the enrolled SimPUF as helper data. We stress that for all PUF-based applications, the PUF enrollment is always a must.
number of clock cycles. Based on our tests, the BLAKE2s-128 hash function only costs 104,732 clock cycles, while a single BCH(255,21,55) code decoding block consumes 8,345,992 clock cycles. If BCH(255,21,55) blocks are chosen to gain a 128-bit security level, the total error correction overhead will be up to 50,075,952 clock cycles-six blocks required in total.
The above experimental overhead evaluation based on both hardware implementation [14] and software implementation explicitly affirms that, in practice, hash function overhead is significantly less than that of error correction. Therefore, discarding the expensive ECC logic assures the TREVERSE authentication to be very lightweight.
Security
For the CPUF and the reverse fuzzy extractor using LAPUF, the helper data poses them under the threaten of reliabilitybased modeling attacks due to that the information leakage through helper data is exploitable to discover response reliability information [17] . In addition, helper data manipulation should be carefully handled, e.g., via integrity check regardless of weak PUF and strong PUF [15] , [18] . We ultimately remove the usage of helper data. Therefore, all attacks induced from the helper data are avoided.
Generic
Firstly, the TREVERSE authentication is generic to all PUF types as long as the PUF has its corresponding SimPUF. Secondly, the validated two simple yet efficient and complementary authentication augment methods-dauthentication and multiple-reference-to enhance TRE-VERSE authentication capability are also applicable to all PUF types.
Server-Aided
The TREVERSE authentication fully takes advantage of resource-rich server. Firstly, it is the server enrolling the SimPUF during the enrollment, then grading the PUF response reliability confidence, to carry out the trials and checks during the authentication phase. Secondly, for the recommended TREVERSE-B instantiation where the LAPUF is exploited, the server exploits machine learning techniques to easily build/enroll the SimPUF of the LAPUF.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The developed TREVERSE authentication fully leverages computational resource-rich server to ensure a lightweight token realization. We ultimately discard expensive ECC logic, thus, removing the necessity of the helper data that always leaks exploitable information to an adversary. Through implementing the d-authentication and multiplereference that complement with each other to exponentially enhance the authentication capability, we assure the authentication to be completed within (tens) thousands of trials by tolerating BER up to 9.66% and 14.53% for ROPUF and LAPUF, respectively. Notably, there is no difficult for the server enrolling more referenced responses to further reduce the trials. Such an achievement guarantees the devised TREVERSE applicable to practical application scenarios that a bunch of tokens are authenticated concurrently. We believe that in practice parallel computation can also be adopted to further expedite the TREVERSE authentication. 
APPENDIX .1 Results of d-Authentication
In Tables 7 and 8 , we give empirical and statistical evaluations on the FRR d of ROPUF and LAPUF respectively. When the d = 10, the FRR d is significantly reduced. In practice, considering that the PUF operating condition vary not too much, e.g., no more than 10% voltage deviation (1.08 V-1.32 V), the d-authentication can already minimize the FRR d to be acceptable. For example, when the m = 16, the FRR d is always less than 10 −3 .
.2 Results of Multiple-Reference
In Table 9 , the λ 1 , λ 2 and of the ROPUF based on two referenced operating corners, ref 1 of (25 • C, 1.08 V) and ref 2 of (25
• C, 1.32 V), are experimentally evaluated. In Tables 10 and 11 , by using two-reference, we experimentally and statistically evaluate the FRR ref1 , FRR ref2 and consequently FRR mr for ROPUF and LAPUF, respectively. It is obvious that the FRR mr is significantly reduced. For example, in Table 2 , the FRR of the ROPUF is up to 90% when a single referenced operating corner is used under the settings of m = 12, n = 64. In Table 10 , the FRR mr is substantially reduced to 27% when two-reference is exploited under the same m and n settings. 
